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Abstract 
Remuneration for chief executives in UK higher education – known as Vice Chancellors (VCs) 
– has been on an upward trend in recent years, and VCs have received criticism that their 
performance does not warrant such reward. We investigate the relationship between VC pay 
and performance (rooted in principal agent theory), taking into account an array of other 
possible determinants. Deriving measures of VC performance is difficult as VCs are agents for 
various principals, and each principal may be interested in a different aspect of performance. 
We consider three measures of VC performance here: managerial efficiency as measured by 
data envelopment analysis (DEA); performance in university rankings produced by the media; 
the financial stability of the university. We construct a comprehensive data set, covering 
academic years 2009/10 to 2016/17, a period of considerable change in the UK higher 
education sector including rapidly-rising undergraduate tuition fees. Our results show that, 
once other possible determinants of VC pay are taken into account, the main measure of 
performance which affects VC pay is the one based on media rankings. Thus the agents (VCs) 
appear to be rewarded for delivering against this performance benchmark which is likely to be 
of interest to a variety of principals. This result however varies by type of university suggesting 
that the labour market for VCs differs by mission group.  
Keywords: Efficiency, Performance, Executive Pay, Higher Education  
Acknowledgements: We are grateful for their comments on earlier versions of this paper to 
Deborah Allcock, Geraint Johnes, and the participants of: the European Workshop on 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, London 13th – 15th June 2017; the 5th Workshop on 
Efficiency in Education, Budapest, Hungary 19th – 20th October 2017; and DEA40, Aston 
University, UK 16th – 18th April 2018. We are also grateful to two anonymous referees whose 
comments have improved the paper substantially. 
                                                     
1 Corresponding author 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When the annual survey of UK Vice Chancellors’ (VCs’) pay is released each year, (see, for 
example, Baker 2017a), there follows growing criticism from politicians (Morgan 2017a), 
taken up by the media, of remuneration of VCs.2 Recent figures show that in 2016-17, average 
pay of UK VCs rose by over 3.5% on 2015-16, bringing average remuneration to over £250,000 
(Baker 2017a; Grove 2018a). Rises in VC pay, moreover, are more than the pay increases 
enjoyed by other university staff (Baker 2017a). The UK university sector is not unique in this 
respect; rising VC pay is also observed in other countries including Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, where salary levels suggest that UK VC pay is, in fact, relatively low by 
international standards (Baker 2017a; Shackleton 2017; Ross 2018a; 2018b). Exceptional 
levels of remuneration of leaders are also observed in UK for-profit colleges where some 
individuals are paid more than the highest paid VC in the publicly funded higher education 
sector (Grove 2018b). 
There are nevertheless accusations that UK VCs are paid ‘too much’ (Adams 2017), 
speculation that students’ tuition fees have paid for the recent increases in VCs’ salaries (Baker 
2017b; Weale 2017), and suggestions that universities should provide a justification for paying 
VCs more than £150,000 with penalties for those institutions which fail to comply (Department 
for Education 2017; Morgan 2017b). The underlying premise of these criticisms is that VCs’ 
performance does not warrant such reward.  
The trajectory through to VC has traditionally been based on an academic track record, but 
recently there has been a growing debate around the premise that VCs are not academics but 
executives (Smith and Adams 2008; O'Meara and Petzall 2009).  Recent changes in funding 
mechanisms have meant that the distinction between the university governing body having the 
strategic role, and the chief executive merely delivering that strategy, has altered; strategy and 
executive leadership are now fundamentally linked, and it is the VC who is more likely than 
the governing body to be making the necessary policy decisions. If VCs are indeed executives, 
then VC pay should be examined in the context of traditional executive pay theories.  
Marginal product theory, which suggests that pay reflects the executive’s marginal revenue, is 
unlikely to be of primary relevance in this context, since it assumes that the firm’s objective is 
to maximise profit. In UK higher education, institutions in receipt of public funds are 
traditionally considered to be non-profit.  
We turn instead to alternative executive pay theories and, in particular, to performance as the 
driving force for remuneration. The idea that pay might be related to performance is rooted in 
principal agent theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Hölmstrom 1979; Fama 1980; Jensen and 
Zimmerman 1985; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Conyon 2006), which assumes the agents (VCs) 
are delivering against targets set by the principals. In the private sector, these would typically 
be shareholders, but for universities the situation is complex as students, their parents, staff, 
the government and university councils, to name but a few, could all be considered principals. 
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The theory predicts that agents’ pay is related to their success at achieving the targets of the 
principals, but in the complex context of higher education, priorities across principals may not 
exactly align. Moreover, the greater the size and complexity of the organisation, the more 
difficult it is for principals to observe their agents’ efforts and performance, and hence the 
greater the number of performance metrics which might be used.  
The literature on executive pay in the private sector suggests that, over the last two decades, 
companies around the world are increasingly incorporating performance-related aspects to pay 
(Pepper and Gore 2015). Principal agent theory (and the relationship between performance and 
pay) is also likely to be highly relevant in determining the pay of UK VCs which is set by a 
remuneration committee comprising key figures in the university.3 This committee uses 
performance metrics (consonant with principal agent theory) to set the individual’s pay (Baker 
2017a), and these are likely to vary according to the institution’s strategy and mission (Bachan 
and Reilly 2015; Baker 2017a).  
The purpose of this paper is therefore to undertake an analysis of VC pay over the most recent 
period of higher education expansion and rising tuition fees in order to answer our primary 
question: 
 Does VC performance in leading a university determine VC remuneration? In other 
words, is there evidence to support the relevance of the principal agent theory in 
determining executive pay in UK higher education? 
In order to conduct such an examination, however, we need to be able to define what we mean 
by ‘performance’. This is not easy; Bachan and Reilly (2017) suggest: ‘… it is difficult to 
define what exactly constitutes ‘performance’ in higher education. For example, it may be 
income generation, research/teaching quality, student enrolment, achieving institution goals or 
combinations of all of these.’ (p421). Moreover, they conclude ‘… that measuring VC 
performance is difficult … that VCs face multiple principals, perform multiple tasks, and work 
as part of a team seeking to meet institutional goals and objectives. However, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that good financial management and furthering the institution’s 
mission should be rewarded.’ (p421). In light of these observations, we therefore carefully 
choose and include in our model three measures of performance reflecting (respectively) 
managerial efficiency, university ranking and financial prudence, and these are explained in 
more detail below.  
Performance is not the only possible determinant of VC pay. In order to avoid biased estimates 
from omitted variables, we therefore also include variables to reflect additional executive pay 
theories in the VC pay equation, such as human capital, structural, and tournament theories. 
Structural theory (Simon 1957) argues that executives receive highest pay where the structure 
of the organisation is most complex. Tournament theory (Lazear and Sherwin 1981; Rosen 
                                                     
3 Indeed, in the past over two thirds of VCs in the UK are entitled to attend the meetings of their remuneration 
committee (Abrams 2017). This is not dissimilar to private companies where there is evidence that a substantial 
proportion of compensation committees have in their membership the executive director (Firth et al 1999; Conyon 
1994). Recent guidelines issued by the CUC, however, recommends that the head of the institutions should not 
be a member of the institution’s remuneration committee (https://www.universitychairs.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/HE-Remuneration-Code.pdf).  
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1986; Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990) suggests that chief executive remuneration can 
incentivise workers at all levels in the firm, thus pay is related to grade rather than marginal 
product. Human capital theory (Mincer 1974; Becker 1993) suggests that that chief executive 
pay is related to the qualities, qualifications and experience of the individual. Time and 
university effects are also explored. This paper therefore builds on the work of Bachan (2008) 
and Bachan and Reilly (2015; 2017), and extends the debate specifically around the role of VC 
performance in determining pay of UK VCs (ceteris paribus). 
Criticisms of VC pay levels in the UK are not new but recur regularly (Goddard and Richards 
1999; Fearn 2011). The context of recent criticism differs, however, in one important respect: 
VC pay has been rising over the period during which tuition fees have been increasing, and 
most recently the hike to £9,000. There is therefore the suggestion that as students have been 
paying more for their university education, those tuition fees have been used to bolster VC 
salaries (Baker 2017b; Weale 2017). An analysis of VC pay is therefore timely. 
The paper is original in several respects. We explore the effect on VC pay of three performance 
metrics. Our first measure of performance is an estimate of managerial efficiency for each year 
of the study derived using data envelopment analysis (DEA). We therefore look at the 
efficiency with which VCs maximise outputs from their given inputs, and this differs from 
previous studies which include variables relating to inputs or to outputs, but do not look at 
efficient usage of resources in producing outputs. DEA is an ideal way of capturing managerial 
efficiency in a production context where there are multiple inputs and multiple outputs, and it 
is novel in its application in a VC pay framework.  
Second, we include a measure of performance based on university rankings published by media 
outlets. Media rankings, such as those produced by The Times, Sunday Times, The Guardian, 
and The Independent (which publishes The Complete University Guide), are based on a 
composite index constructed from a variety of performance metrics. We incorporate the overall 
performance score produced by The Complete University Guide as our second measure of 
performance. Variables relating to the components of university rankings have been included 
in previous studies of VC pay, but the use of media rankings in such studies is limited; Tang et 
al (2000), for example, include overall ranking in their study of the pay of chief executives in 
US universities. 
Third, we include a measure of financial stability to see whether financial prudence is reflected 
in VC remuneration. The increasingly competitive environment in which universities now 
operate means that some universities are looking somewhat vulnerable. The inclusion of this 
measure in VC pay equations is entirely novel. 
As a brief preview of our results, we find that university performance does indeed help to 
determine VC pay, thereby supporting the principal-agent theory of remuneration, but only in 
one respect. Of three possible measures of performance tested, the one based on overall 
university rating derived from The Complete University Guide is the most consistently 
important in determining pay. Managerial performance as derived using DEA is not an 
important determinant of VC pay. In addition, VCs in pre-1992 institutions are paid 
significantly more than those in post-1992 universities, all else being equal. Size of university 
and a higher percentage of staff in the top salary category both positively influence VC pay. 
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An interesting finding of the analysis is that different factors determine VCs’ salaries in pre- 
and post-1992 universities.4 While performance is crucial for determining the pay of pre-1992 
VCs, it is not for those in post-1992 institutions. Size and taking over as VC in a given year are 
relevant for post-1992 VCs, but not for their pre-1992 colleagues.  
The paper is in seven sections of which this is the first. In section II we provide a brief 
background of the UK higher education sector, and a literature review is provided in section 
III. The methodological approach to our empirical analysis is outlined in section IV with results 
presented in section V. We conduct some robustness checks in section VI, and conclusions are 
drawn in section VII. 
 
II. The UK higher education context 
 
The last three decades have seen considerable change in the UK higher education sector. 
Between 1987 and 1997, the age participation rate grew from 15% to 33% (Lunt 2008), and 
during this period, the ‘binary divide’ between universities and polytechnics was abolished as 
part of the Further and Higher Education Act in 1992. The Blair government committed in 
1999 to a target 50% age participation rate in the subsequent decade, and this was confirmed 
in the Labour Party manifesto of 2001 (Lunt 2008). This expansion and changing composition 
of the UK higher education sector – a move from elite to mass higher education – inevitably 
put pressure on funding. The Dearing Report (NICHE 1997) recommended that students should 
contribute to the costs of their higher education, and in 1998 student tuition fees of £1000 were 
introduced. By 2006, these had increased to £3000. Following the Browne Report (Browne 
2010), the government agreed to a tuition fee cap of between £6000 and £9000 and this was 
introduced in 2012, and accompanied by an increasingly complex student loan system.5 The 
combination of increased undergraduate fees, and uncapped undergraduate students’ numbers 
subsequently led to an unprecedented level of marketisation in the UK higher education sector.6 
Over the last two to three decades, UK VCs have therefore been operating in an increasingly 
competitive market (both domestically and globally), facing greater demands, and typically 
heading up bigger and more complex institutions (Whitchurch 2006; Bosetti and Walker 2010; 
Cutterham 2017). In 1994/95, figures from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) 
indicate that there were 1.5m students studying at 182 higher education providers which had 
just under 115,000 (full-time and part-time) academic staff. By 2015/16 this had risen to 2.3m 
students across 163 higher education providers with over 201,000 full-time equivalent staff. 
Performance indicators in higher education abound with regular research assessments (the 
latest Research Excellence Framework – REF – was in 2014, but this was preceded by various 
                                                     
4 The UK higher education sector comprises a variety of institutions including those which had degree-awarding 
powers prior to the abolition of the binary divide in 1992 (pre-1992 institutions), and those which did not (post-
1992 universities). 
5 This applies to the situation in England. Note that funding systems differ between England and the rest of the 
UK i.e. Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
6 For more details on the current UK higher education sector please see https://www.universitychairs.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/HE-Remuneration-Code-Context.pdf.  
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Research Assessment Exercises – RAEs), and more recently teaching assessment in the form 
of the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF). Unexpected exogenous shocks in the form of, 
for example, Brexit, and unforeseen policy changes on student numbers and fees also pose 
significant challenges for VCs in UK universities. Funding is crucial to being able to maintain 
a competitive edge, yet sources of funding for universities are not as certain as they once were 
– indeed some universities are resorting to the bond market to obtain funding for investment in 
facilities and residences (Johnes 2016b). 
In line with the structural theory of executive pay we would therefore expect rising 
remuneration with these increasing complexities and pressures, although studies exploring the 
link between expansion of universities and the professional managerial skills required to lead 
these are limited. In addition, little is known about the labour market for UK VCs. However, 
we do know that the average tenure of VCs has been falling in recent years,7 and that the highest 
paid UK VCs earn less than their international counterparts in, for example, the USA and 
Australia (Blanchflower 2017; Ross 2018b), less than counterparts in the UK for-profit higher 
education and education sectors (Grove 2018b; Bennett 2019), and less than chief executive 
officers (CEOs) of private sector companies. We speculate that the labour market for VCs is 
likely to be an international one (as is the market for academics more generally), and that 
universities seeking VCs are likely to have limited numbers of applicants of the appropriate 
skills and calibre (Blanchflower 2017).  
Against this backdrop, Jo Johnson (a former Minister for Universities and Science) recently 
called for justification of any VC pay exceeding £150,000 – the current salary of the Prime 
Minister (Department for Education 2017). His successor (Sam Gyimah) continued to focus on 
VC pay, calling for VCs to be removed from their University’s remuneration committee 
(Guardian 2018), and recent guidance by the Committee of University Chairs (CUC) supports 
this recommendation.8 This study, which aims to provide insights into the determinants of VC 
pay, is therefore important and timely, and will inform the on-going debate. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
There have been a number of studies investigating whether performance of firms is a key driver 
of the pay structure of their chief executives (Chen et al 2016).9 On the one hand studies have 
shown a positive correlation between firm performance and average pay (Nickell and 
Wadhwani 1990; Nickell et al 1994; Hall and Liebman 1998) and on the other, evidence 
suggests a weak correlation between executive compensation and firm performance (Murphy 
1999; Joyce 2001). Principal agent theory argues that CEO pay is designed to attract, retain 
and motivate the managers, who are the agents, to focus their efforts on the objectives of the 
                                                     
7 The peak length of tenure was about 6.5 years in the mid-1970s compared to 5 years in 2016 (see 
https://www.hepi.ac.uk/2016/11/03/3665/).  
8 https://www.universitychairs.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/HE-Remuneration-Code.pdf.  
9 Studies of VC pay and chief executive pay more generally are summarised in an online Appendix: 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxqb2huZXNqaWxsfGd4OjJj
N2NmNTIzOGMxN2NkMjY. 
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owners, who are the principals. Pay is therefore part of an optimal remuneration package where 
the behaviour of the CEO is difficult to observe and/or to monitor. The package often comprises 
two parts: a fixed (or base) element, and a variable (or bonus) element, with the latter depending 
on performance observed ex post (Bachan and Reilly 2015; 2017).  
Despite the agency theory predictions, it has been argued that there is no consistent evidence 
of a link between pay and performance (Frydman and Jenter 2010). Instead, studies point out 
the importance of other determinants such as firm size. For instance, Tosi et al (2000) applied 
a meta-analysis to show that firm size accounts for more than 40% of the variance in total CEO 
pay, while firm performance accounts for less than 5% of the variance.  
Whether or not universities follow the same pattern with performance linked to a two-part pay 
package is open to debate.  Recently it has been argued that leadership and managerial skills 
needed to run universities have become comparable with the skills needed to manage private 
sector companies (Cheng 2014), and hence the question also arises whether the VC pay 
package (comprising basic and bonus elements) is related to university performance, 
particularly in times when universities strive to achieve greater efficiency in the midst of 
extreme budgetary crisis. However, the structure of higher education is complex. Unlike private 
sector firms, HEIs do not have owners in the form of shareholders, and multiple principal agent 
relationships exist. This creates a lack of clarity around the organisation’s goals, and the design 
of any optimal remuneration package is extremely difficult. VCs are therefore likely to be 
assessed on numerous parameters in contrast to the corporate CEOs, where the governing 
board, as a principal, may only be looking at budgets, capital spending, size or other structural 
characteristics such as inherited reputation to determine pay; but the university chief 
executive’s pay will also be affected by, inter alia, staff research productivity and outputs, and 
students' satisfaction, academic achievement and performance in the labour market.  
Empirical studies have searched for evidence for a pay performance relationship, even though 
the agency theory linkage may be difficult to identify because of lack of consistently applied 
performance measures across different institutions (Cheng 2014). There is evidence of a 
positive link for UK VCs between performance and total pay including bonuses (Dolton and 
Ma 2003), but the link may be weak (Bachan 2008; Tarbert et al 2008). More recently Cheng 
(2014) finds no link between pay and performance of university presidents in the US.   
Multiple performance indicators, for public higher education institutions (HEIs), have been 
suggested and used by different studies. Bachan (2008) include a comprehensive array of 
performance indicators including research and teaching quality, student attrition and students’ 
participation in higher education. Bachan and Reilly (2015) extend this to include mission-
based performance measures such as widening participation. Tarbert et al (2008) also use the 
mission-relevant university performance measures to study the impact on VC pay. Cheng 
(2014) uses several performance outcome indicators, namely: progress in applications and 
enrolment, admission standards, student graduation, faculty salary and welfare, fund-raising, 
administrative efficiency, and operating surplus. Dolton and Ma (2003) focus more on the 
financial and research performance of the university. Ehrenberg et al (2001) find university 
presidents’ salary increases are associated with improvements in their fundraising success as a 
measure of institutions’ performance. Tang et al (2000) suggest that ‘subjective’ academic 
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reputation ranking may be considered as one of the best proxies of the performance. Three 
performance indicators derived from the UK Research Assessment Exercise, are utilised by 
Baimbridge and Simpson (1996) – the average weighted rating attained by each institution, the 
number of units of assessment, and the percentage of staff submitted as research active.  
The use of numerous dimensions of performance indicators poses an apparent complexity when 
interpreting the performance measures, and hence the need to identify a meaningful aggregate 
performance index (Bougnol and Dulá 2006; Johnes 2016a; 2018). There is now a substantial 
literature applying DEA to higher education10 mainly because DEA is applicable whether or 
not inputs and/or outputs are subject to any pricing mechanism. Several studies have applied 
DEA specifically to address the issue of multiple stakeholders in the higher education context 
starting with Sarrico et al (1997). Sarrico and Dyson (2000) explore DEA to inform 
management in the midst of different stakeholders having different motivations to measure 
performance in the UK higher education sector, while de França et al (2010) suggest the use 
of DEA optimisation separately on principal’s and agent’s objectives by focusing on the 
Brazilian not-for-profit federal university system. They find that the agency problem exists for 
a subset of those institutions.  
Despite the considerable application of DEA to research questions relating to higher education, 
DEA has not been used in the context of VC pay, and particularly the relationship between pay 
and performance, although it has been used in the context of chief executive pay more generally 
(Chen et al 2016). This is an interesting omission and seems to be an obvious area in which 
DEA could offer insights. 
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
 
We understand from recent guidelines issued by the CUC that it is legitimate for VC pay to 
vary with respect to the individual’s performance. We therefore use a standard salary equation 
(below) to explore the role of university performance in affecting VC pay. Included in the 
equation are additional variables, many relating to alternative executive pay theories, in order 
to minimize bias from omitted variables: 
VC Pay = f (VC performance, other possible determinants) 
a) Performance (principal agent theory) 
While CUC guidelines acknowledge that VC remuneration can vary in respect of the 
individual’s performance, there is no indication of how performance might be measured.11 We 
therefore adopt 3 possible measures of performance.  
The first measure relates to managerial efficiency and can be seen as of particular interest to 
various possible principals including, in particular, the government, and the university’s 
governing body. The measure is identified by applying DEA to an array of university inputs 
                                                     
10 For reviews see Liu et al 2013; Johnes 2015; De Witte, K. and L. López-Torres 2015; Thanassoulis et al 2016. 
11 https://www.universitychairs.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/HE-Remuneration-Code.pdf.  
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and outputs. DEA creates a best-practice frontier based on the specified inputs and outputs, and 
measures the efficiency of each university relative to that frontier. We use DEA efficiency 
(rather than alternative efficiency measures such as those derived from stochastic frontier 
analysis) as we have multiple inputs and multiple outputs, which DEA can easily handle, and 
the scores are measured relative to an observed frontier. The assumption is that each 
university’s efficiency score is largely attributed to the VC leading the university. DEA 
provides an efficiency score which takes values between 0 and 1 with 1 representing highest 
efficiency. 
Taking a DEA approach, and assuming that inputs 𝑥𝑘 (𝑘 =  1, . . . , 𝐾) are used to produce 
outputs 𝑦𝑚 (𝑚 =  1, . . . , 𝑀), then managerial efficiency of the firm or decision making unit 
(DMU) 𝑗 at time t is defined as (Banker et al 1984): 
𝑉𝑅𝑆𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝑎𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑚𝑗𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
∑ 𝑏𝑘𝑡𝑥𝑘𝑗𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
          (1) 
Where 𝑎𝑚𝑡 is the weight applied to output 𝑚 in time 𝑡 and 𝑏𝑘𝑡 is the weight applied to input 𝑘 
in time 𝑡. For each DMU in a given year, weights are found by maximising efficiency subject 
to the constraints that weights must be non-zero and universal. The efficiency score in equation 
(1) can be calculated on the basis of constant returns to scale and hence incorporates both scale 
and managerial effects, or, by adding a convexity constraint, on the basis of variable returns to 
scale. The latter efficiencies are deemed to represent managerial efficiency in isolation from 
scale effects, and so it is these variable returns to scale estimates we use to represent VC 
efficiency (VRS). We hypothesise that universities take students, staff and capital to produce 
teaching and research outputs. Thus, as inputs into the DEA model we include the number of 
full-time equivalent (FTE) students on postgraduate programmes (PGINPUT), the number of 
FTE students enrolled on undergraduate programmes (UGINPUT), the number of FTE 
academic staff (STAFF), the number of FTE non-academic staff (ADMIN), and expenditure 
on library and computing facilities (ACSERV). The outputs produced from these inputs include 
graduates from postgraduate programmes (PGOUTPUT), graduates from undergraduate 
programmes (UGOUTPUT) and income received from research grants and contracts 
(RESEARCH). A full list and definition of variables in this model (including sources) is 
provided in table 1. The pros and cons of this model specification and the DEA methodology 
have been discussed in detail elsewhere and are therefore not reproduced here (see, for 
example, Johnes 2014).  
Table 1 here 
Our second performance variable is the financial security index (FSI) produced by the Higher 
Education Statistical Agency (HESA) for each university in the UK. This indicator is based on 
four financial metrics namely: 
• The last 2 years’ average historical cost surplus as a percentage of total income  
Historical cost surplus is the surplus of income over expenditure from a HEI’s annual 
audited financial statements. It is a measure of surplus and the denominator provides a 
standardisation to allow comparisons between HEIs. 
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• Days ratio of general funds to total expenditure   
General funds are balance sheet reserves that have been created from the past years’ 
retained surpluses. Thus, high general funds will have been created by historically high 
surpluses or by retaining surpluses over a sustained period of time, or by a combination of 
the two. General funds are then measured against days of expenditure in order to provide a 
standardisation and compare institutions of different size.  
• Days ratio of net liquidity to total expenditure, excluding depreciation   
Liquidity is the level of cash or equivalent liquid funds held in the balance sheet. Cash will 
have been generated by creating historic levels of surplus above those necessary for 
immediate investment needs. Consequently, it gives a level of resilience relative to 
unexpected demands on an HEI’s resources. 
• Long term borrowings as a percentage of total income  
Borrowings are the level of external debt in the balance sheet such as bank overdrafts or 
loans. High long term borrowings are often an indicator there has been a need for high 
investment eg in a HEI’s estate. Again, this is measured relative to the size of the HEI by a 
calculation based on a percentage of total income. 
Each of these four metrics is separately ranked, and the subsequent 4 rankings are then 
summed. A final ranking is produced from this sum, and this is the FSI. This measure of 
performance is likely to be of interest to various principals including the government who 
wishes to see public funds used prudently, and the university’s governing body. 
Our third performance variable is based on data from media rankings of universities. 
Specifically, we use data from The Complete University Guide, which bases its overall 
performance score (and hence rankings) on the following 9 dimensions:12 student entry 
standards; student satisfaction; research quality; graduate prospects; student-staff ratio; 
academic services spend; facilities spend; good honours; and degree completion. It is the 
overall performance score (OVERALL) rather than the ranking which we include in our salary 
equation. The principals who are most likely to be interested in this measure include the 
university’s students (including prospective students) and staff, as well as the university’s 
governing body. This variable might be seen as a measure of ‘reputation’ as well as 
performance. The performance score is derived as a composite index of the ten underlying 
metrics and is transformed to a scale where the top score is 1000. In a robustness check (see 
section VI) we examine the role of the underlying components in determining VC pay. Student 
satisfaction and student performance (i.e. achievement of good degree results), for example, 
might be of particular interest to principals and hence important determinants of VC pay. 
b) Additional possible determinants 
Structural theory suggests that organisational complexity affects CEO pay, and so we include 
variables to reflect this aspect. The most obvious indicator of potential complexities is the size 
of university, and we therefore include the total number of students, both undergraduates and 
postgraduates, to reflect this aspect (SIZE). The natural logarithm of SIZE (LSIZE) and its 
                                                     
12 Source: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/methodology/ accessed 17th July 2017.  
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square (LSIZESQ) are included; the former addresses the issue of outliers and non-normality 
of standard errors, while the latter addresses the issue of non-linearity. 
Second, we note that universities in the UK have different historical backgrounds and missions 
which may lead to different sets and levels of complexity. In particular, pre-1992 HEIs are 
traditional universities which had university status prior to the Further and Higher Education 
Act of 1992. These institutions undertake teaching (undergraduate and postgraduate) and 
research in a whole range of subjects including (unlike other types of institution) medical and 
veterinary sciences. Universities not in this category (post-1992 institutions) include both 
former polytechnics which, by the provision of the Further and Higher Education Act, have, 
since 1992, been allowed to award their own degrees and use the title university, and former 
colleges of higher education, many of which have applied for university (and degree-awarding) 
status since 2003. The effect of university type on VC pay is uncertain a priori. On the one 
hand, VCs of the more research-intensive pre-1992 universities may face greater complexities 
than those leading other types of universities (Ehrenberg et al 2001), and therefore a dummy 
variable reflecting this type of institution (PRE1992) would have a positive relationship with 
VC pay. Indeed, recent evidence suggests relatively high pay amongst VCs of Russell Group 
HEIs (Grove 2018c) which are a subset of the pre-1992 group. On the other hand, VCs of post-
1992 universities might find the competition in the national and global higher education 
markets particularly intense which would mean their performance would need to be raised in 
order to compete, and hence our dummy variable PRE1992 would display a negative 
relationship with VC pay. 
Third, we include a dummy to reflect merger activity which has taken place (MERGER), as 
leading an institution which has undergone merger is likely to offer more challenges and 
complexities than one which has not, all else being equal. 
Tournament theory argues that the chief executive can be perceived as the winner of a prize 
which sends a signal to those working lower down in the hierarchy that by working hard they 
too can compete for the top prize. We do not have data on number of candidates competing for 
vacant VC posts (we would expect there to be a positive relationship between number of 
candidates and pay), and so we fall back on the internal pay structure of the organisation as an 
indicator of the influence of tournament theory on VC pay. This is in line with previous studies 
(see, for example, Dolton and Ma 2003; Tarbert et al 2008; Bachan and Reilly 2015; 2017). 
We therefore include the percentage of staff in the upper salary bracket (TOPSALCAT) and 
hypothesise that the greater the percentage the higher the VC salary, thereby offering support 
for tournament theory. It is worth noting that during the period of this study there was a large 
increase in professorial pay in the run-up to REF 2014 (Grove 2013), and this may therefore 
increase the relevance of tournament theory in the context of VC pay. 
Linked to this is Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol and Bowen 1966) which might also affect VC 
salaries. Baumol observed rising salaries over time in jobs which experienced no increase in 
labour productivity and hypothesised that this occurs because of productivity gains in other 
sectors: salary increases in jobs where there are productivity gains will attract candidates from 
sectors without those gains, unless salaries rise there as well. It is difficult to incorporate a 
variable to measure this effect but we include academic salaries as a percentage of total 
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university expenditure as a proxy.13 If Baumol’s cost disease hypothesis holds, we might expect 
a positive relationship between this variable and VC pay. On the other hand, this variable might 
be a reflection of importance (or lack of importance) of certain activities. Thus, universities 
which are not particularly research intensive may have a high proportion of expenditure on 
academic staff salaries because they do not win a large amount of research grant income. Since 
we would expect VCs from universities with a strong research reputation to earn more than 
others, ceteris paribus, this variable may, in this case, have a negative relationship with VC 
pay. 
The previous theories and related variables have covered performance and characteristics of 
the institution. We turn now to the characteristics of the chief executive him/herself. Human 
capital theory argues that pay is related to personal characteristics such as qualifications and 
past experience. We therefore include a number of variables in this category: the VC’s age 
(VCAGE) to reflect experience; gender (VCMALE) to assess whether there is a gender pay 
gap amongst VCs; VCNOPREVEXP to reflect whether the VC previously held a pro-VC 
(PVC) or VC post (or equivalent) prior to this role; VCINDEXP to examine the possible effect 
of having industrial experience prior to the current role; and VCNEW, a dummy variable, to 
reflect a new VC taking over in a particular year for a given university. We hypothesise a 
positive relationship between VCAGE and VC salary (Alves et al 2016), and VCNEW and VC 
salary; and a negative relationship between VCNOPREVEXP and VC pay. We remain open-
minded regarding the effect on VC remuneration of gender and industrial experience. 
There are potentially regional differences in UK labour markets which might impact VC pay 
(Baimbridge and Simpson 1996). London, for example, is known to be a high-cost area and 
salaries add a London weighting to accommodate this. Location in regions on the periphery 
such as Wales and Scotland may exert downward pressure on salaries. Devolved governments 
to Scotland and Wales mean there are also differences in the funding provision for universities 
in these countries which might also have a knock-on effect on VC pay, although the effect is 
not clear a priori. We therefore include three regional dummies, LONDON, SCOT, and 
WALES, to reflect location in London, Scotland and Wales respectively. 
We include year dummies to assess whether there are any year effects once all other possible 
factors have been taken into consideration. We know that VC salaries in the UK have been 
rising over time (Baker 2017a; Grove 2018a), and explore whether this is still the case once 
variables underpinning VC pay are taken into account.  
c) Model specification 
Our pay data cover a 7-year period from 2010/11 to 2016/17 and are derived from a variety of 
sources. The Times Higher Education is the source of data on VC pay which was converted to 
2016 real values using the standard Retail Price Index (RPI). 
Remaining variables cover the period from 2009/10 to allow for explanatory variables to be 
lagged. Institutional data and internal pay structure data are derived from HESA. University 
performance is from The Complete University Guide, and data on VC characteristics are 
gathered from university profiles, Wikipedia, Who’s Who and LinkedIn. To construct our data 
                                                     
13 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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set, we excluded university colleges, postgraduate-only institutions, and specialist medical, art 
music and drama provisions.  After such exclusions, 149 higher education institutions remain.   
Given that we have panel data, we use a random effects (RE) approach to estimate the following 
equation: 
𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝐸1992𝑗 +  𝛽7𝑀𝐸𝑅𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝛽9𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑉𝐶𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑉𝐶𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽12𝑉𝐶𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑉𝐶𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑉𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛽16𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽17𝑊𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖 +
𝛽182011 +𝛽192012 + 𝛽202013 + 𝛽212014 + 𝛽222015 + 𝛽232016 + µ𝑖𝑗𝑡  (2) 
Where 𝐿 denotes natural logarithm and 𝑉𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the annual pay including bonuses for 
the 𝑖th VC in the 𝑗th institution at time 𝑡. We check the robustness of our results to the definition 
of salary and use annual pay (excluding bonuses) when undertaking robustness checks in 
Section VI. 
The definitions of all the explanatory variables are reported in full in table 1. We note two 
important considerations. First, time-varying right hand side variables are lagged (as in, for 
example, Firth et al 1999). This is because it is assumed that VC pay is more likely to be related 
to past than current values, and that recent performance is of more relevance than historical 
performance. This also has the advantage that possible endogeneity issues are avoided. Second, 
we use RE (as in Dolton and Ma 2003) as we are interested in the effects of some time-invariant 
variables which would not be revealed with, for example, fixed effects (FE) estimation. RE, 
however, assumes that there is no correlation between the VC (random) effects and the 
independent variables included in the equation. We consider alternative estimation methods 
when undertaking robustness checks in Section VI. 
The descriptive statistics relating to the variables included in the panel data estimation are 
provided in table 2. VC salary varies considerably as expected (see figure 1 for further 
illustration), and the explanatory variables demonstrate the diversity of the UK higher 
education sector in all dimensions. VCs themselves are aged around 59 on average, are largely 
male (80%); very few have no previous experience relating to either VC or PVC roles (22%) 
and VCs do not typically have industrial experience (only 32% have). An analysis of between 
and within variation for the non-binary explanatory variables (see table 3) suggests much more 
variation between VCs (given time) than within VCs (over time). This is much as one would 
expect a priori. 
Table 2 here 
Figure 1 here 
Table 3 here 
A correlation matrix is presented in table 4. This suggests that multi-collinearity should not be 
a particular problem when interpreting the results in the next section. 
Table 4 here 
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V. Results and Discussion 
 
The results from applying RE to the estimation of equation (2) are reported in table 5. We 
consider first of all the results of the estimation applied to all observations in the sample.  The 
overall R2 suggests a moderately strong explanatory power, and aligns with the results obtained 
in previous VC pay studies (Tang et al 2000; Bachan 2008; Tarbert et al 2008; Cheng 2014), 
but is perhaps generally a little weaker than for studies of CEO pay (Chen et al 2016; Smirnova 
and Zavertiaeva 2017).  
Table 5 here 
In terms of performance we find that, once other possible variables are included, VC pay is 
determined by neither the managerial efficiency measure as reflected by our DEA model of 
efficiency, nor by the financial security index produced by HESA. In fact, the only measure of 
performance which appears to be related to VC pay is the overall performance score produced 
by The Complete University Guide and from which their university rankings are produced. This 
is an interesting finding and we speculate that the ease of observation of and public spotlight 
on this variable might explain this result. In addition, this is likely to capture the interests of 
multiple stakeholders. Further investigation of the components from which the score 
(OVERALL) is calculated14 reveals that it is entry standards (as measured by UCAS tariff entry 
score of new undergraduate students) and good honours (the percentage of first degree 
graduates achieving a first or upper second class honours degree) which are the components 
significantly related (positively) to VC pay. These results cause us to speculate further that it 
is university reputation rather than performance driving VC pay (which is in line with the 
results and interpretation of Tang et al 2000), but further work is required to explore this more. 
Turning now to the other variables in the equation, we find that size has a significantly positive 
relationship with VC salary (LSIZE is significant, but LSIZESQ is not). This therefore suggests 
that greater organisational complexity is a positive driver of VC pay. In addition, having a 
higher proportion of highly paid staff positively affects VC pay, as might be expected. It is 
worth noting that the 2014 REF resulted in many universities enticing, with high salaries, 
professors with excellent research outputs into their organisations to boost their REF 
submission. This may well have had a knock-on effect of raising VC salaries. 
VC age is the only VC characteristic affecting remuneration (positively), and this is only at the 
10% significance level. These results are in line with previous findings (Bachan 2008; Bachan 
and Reilly 2015; 2017). There appears to be no evidence from our initial estimations that VC 
remuneration varies significantly by previous experience or gender. 
Location of university is important in determining level of pay in only one case: VCs located 
in Wales have significantly lower salaries than VCs in other locations by around 7%. Salaries 
in the later years of the period are significantly higher than those in the base year (2010), and 
this is in line with the findings of Bachan and Reilly (2017) who also find that salaries have 
been increasing over time after taking into account various factors of pay. Whether this is 
                                                     
14 These results are not reported in detail; but are available on request. 
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related to the rise in student fees over the period, increases in executive pay more generally, or 
the increasing marketisation of higher education and its consequent impact on VCs, is open to 
speculation. 
We note that VCs in pre-1992 HEIs have significantly higher pay, on average, than those in 
post-1992 universities, holding all else constant. This adds support to our hypothesis that 
reputation (pre-1992 HEIs tend to be established, research-intensive universities) is an 
important factor in determining the remuneration of VCs. We investigate further whether 
factors affecting pay differ by institution types by estimating the model for two sub-samples, 
namely, the pre-1992 and post-1992 universities. The pay of VCs in the pre-1992 universities 
is related to performance as measured by the overall performance score in The Complete 
University Guide, to the proportion of staff in the top salary category, and to the share of 
university expenditure taken by the academic staff bill. The variables OVERALL and 
TOPSALCAT have the expected positive signs, while ACSTAFFSHARE is negatively related 
to VC pay. We speculate that a low value of ACSTAFFSHARE occurs when universities are 
particularly research-intensive and their expenditure is taken up (more proportionately) by 
research-related costs. The pre-1992 universities likely vary substantially in terms of 
ACSTAFFSHARE with a low value indicating a strong research reputation. The observed 
negative relationship therefore offers further possible evidence that (research) reputation 
positively affects VC pay.  
In contrast, the pay of VCs in the post-1992 set of universities is not related to performance at 
all. Instead it is positively related to both size and whether the VC is new to the institution. 
While VC salary appears not to have changed significantly over time in pre-1992 institutions, 
it has risen significantly in later years in post-1992 universities. It appears that pre- and post-
1992 institutions are operating in different labour markets for their VCs. Not only is the pay of 
VCs in pre-1992 HEIs higher than those in post-1992 universities, the factors which affect 
remuneration are also distinct to each market. These distinctions between pre- and post-1992 
universities are interesting and warrant further investigation in future work, with particular 
focus on the flexibility of VCs to move between universities of different types. 
 
VI. Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we undertake a number of robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our 
results to specification and/or estimation methods. Throughout the analysis we have defined 
VC pay as salary plus bonuses as reported by the THE. The results (see equation 1 in table 6) 
remain remarkably robust to the replacement of salary plus bonuses by salary only: the variable 
OVERALL is still the only performance variable with a significantly positive relationship with 
VC pay. Other variables significant in the equation are largely the same as in previous 
estimations. 
Table 6 here 
When managerial efficiency is calculated on the basis of a DEA model which incorporates 
university expenditure, there is again little change in the conclusions drawn (see equation 2 in 
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table 6). OVERALL continues to be the only performance measure significant in determining 
VC pay. Similar consistency of results is observed when we use logarithms of all the 
performance variables (see equation 3 in table 6). 
When we use FE estimation rather than RE (equation 4 of table 6), we find that OVERALL 
continues to be the only performance variable which is significantly positively related to pay. 
There are some slight differences, though, in the additional variables with a significant 
relationship with VC pay. University size is no longer significant, while VC age has a strong 
positive relationship with pay. VC salary also appears to be falling over time, taking into 
account all other variables, and this is in contrast to other results in tables 5 and 6. 
Most previous literature has used RE or FE to estimate the VC pay equation. One exception to 
this is Cheng (2014) who employs an Arellano Bond estimation method for estimating a salary 
equation for university presidents in the US. The Arellano Bond estimation method allows for 
the possibility of autocorrelation in the data. We apply Arellano Bond and present the results 
in table 7. The results in this case are not altogether consistent with those from other estimations 
and specifications. The only performance variable with a significantly positive relationship 
with VC pay is the FSI variable which is clearly at odds with all the other estimations so far. 
Moreover, while pre-1992 universities typically have significantly more highly paid VCs than 
post-1992 ones, university size, proportion of staff in the top salary category, location in Wales 
and VC age are not significant variables in determining VC pay in the Arellano Bond model. 
Instead, location in London (as expected) has a significantly positive effect on VC pay.  
Table 7 here 
Quite why the results of this estimation method are out of line with results of other estimation 
methods used here is open to debate. First we note that the approach inevitably reduces the 
number of observations (partly because of the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable). It is 
also worth noting that the lagged dependent variable is not significant at conventional 
significance levels, although the AR(1) autocorrelation test is just significant at the 5% 
significance. Therefore, evidence to support the use of Arellano Bond here is unclear, and the 
results should therefore be treated with a degree of caution.   
We undertake a final sensitivity check by estimating the equation, respectively, in levels only 
and with lags of 2 periods (see table 8). It is worth pointing out that our a priori expectation is 
that there is a lag between performance (and other variables) and VC pay, but that this lag is 
likely to be only one period rather than more than that as stakeholders are probably most 
interested in recent performance. Our results indicate that OVERALL is the only significant 
measure of performance when the equation is estimated in levels; however, no performance 
variable is significant when lags of two periods are taken. To the extent that VC performance 
is important, then, it is current and recent performance which are more important than earlier 
performance. 
Table 8 here 
The analysis and robustness checks consistently indicate that managerial performance as 
derived from DEA is not a significant determinant of VC pay. Instead, university ranking is 
the most consistent performance determinant of VC remuneration. In the UK higher education 
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sector, it appears that remuneration committees are more influenced by published (and public) 
performance indicators (and possibly indicators of reputation) than by other measures such as 
the financial security index or the managerial efficiency of VCs in transforming their inputs 
into outputs such as graduates (at all levels) and research. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
We undertake this in-depth examination of the determinants of VC pay in UK higher education 
with a view to exploring the following: 
 Does VC performance in leading a university determine VC remuneration? In other 
words, is there evidence to support the relevance of the principal agent theory in 
determining executive pay in UK higher education? 
The work is original in that it looks at a variety of measures of VC performance including a 
DEA measure of managerial efficiency. We therefore include three possible measures of 
performance: a DEA measure of managerial efficiency at transforming inputs into outputs; the 
performance score used by The Complete University Guide to derive their university rankings; 
and the financial security index produced by HESA. On the basis of data collected over a period 
from 2009/10 to 2016/17, we find support for principal agent theory, but the only measure 
which is significant in the VC pay equation is the performance score from The Complete 
University Guide.  
A raft of robustness checks undertaken to establish the rigour of the results confirms this result 
in all but one case. Only when an Arellano Bond estimation method is used do we find that 
performance measured by the financial security index is the significant performance 
determinant of VC pay. But these particular results should be treated with a degree of caution 
because the lagged dependent variable is not significant, and the AR(1) test is only marginally 
significant at the 5% significance level. What is very clear, however, is that managerial 
efficiency, as measured by DEA, is consistently not a significant determinant of VC pay. 
Another consistent result is that the pay of VCs in pre-1992 universities is typically higher than 
that of VCs in post-1992 HEIs, all else being equal. Further exploration of pre-1992 and post-
1992 subsamples suggests that university ranking is only significant in the former case. When 
the components of the overall performance score are examined, it is entry score and good 
honours degrees which are the most important components in determining VC pay. We 
therefore hypothesise that it is more the reputation of universities, rather than their actual 
performance, which determines pay. 
In line with previous studies we find that VC pay appears to have risen significantly in recent 
periods, particularly in post-1992 universities. This coincides with rising student fees, but it is 
difficult to conclude on the basis of this relatively short time period covered by the analysis 
that the two are related. Indeed, the period also coincides with the lifting of the student numbers 
cap in the UK and hence a period of increasing marketisation and competition in UK higher 
education, making the VC role a particularly challenging one. 
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In addition to university performance and HEI type, there is evidence that size, proportion of 
staff in the top salary category, VC age and location in Wales are all determinants of pay (only 
the last having a negative relationship).  
The subject of VC remuneration is a highly topical one, and the nature of funding in higher 
education (with substantial support from the public purse) makes this work particularly policy-
relevant. We conclude from our results that the call for institutions to justify any VC’s pay 
exceeding £150,000 – around the current salary of the prime minister – is somewhat arbitrary; 
unlike VCs’ salaries, the prime minister’s salary is not subject to competitive labour market 
pressures, and the £150,000 figure does not capture the considerable additional financial 
benefits (present and future) that the post of prime minister carries. Our results indicate that 
performance and other determinants are significant in determining pay, and therefore support 
the conclusion of the 2011 Hutton review of fair pay in the public sector (Hutton 2011) which 
suggested: ‘Government should refrain from using the pay of the prime minister or other 
politicians as a benchmark for the remuneration of senior public servants, whose pay should 
reflect their due desert and be proportional to the weight of their roles and their performance.’  
On the basis of evidence presented here, VCs’ pay, like chief executive pay, appears to be 
determined by the demands of the role, organisational environment, and the performance of the 
individual. It is well-known, however, that being a chief executive in the corporate world brings 
with it responsibilities and increasing accountability. As VC reward increasingly mirrors CEO 
pay, the issue of accountability will inevitably also need to be addressed in the higher education 
sector. 
 
Figure 1: Minimum, maximum and mean salary and benefits by year 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
a) DEA model variables 
Variable Definition  
PGINPUT The total number of FTE postgraduate students (i.e. students on 
programmes of study leading to higher degrees, diplomas and 
certificates, including Postgraduate Certificate of Education 
(PGCE) and professional qualifications)b 
UGINPUT The total number of FTE first degree and other undergraduates. 
The ‘other undergraduates’ category includes qualification aims 
below degree level such as Foundation Degrees and Higher 
National Diploma (HND)b 
STAFF Number of FTE academic staff. 
ADMIN Number of FTE non-academic staff. 
ACSERVa Expenditure incurred on centralised academic services such as 
the library and learning resource centres, central computer and 
computer networks, centrally run museums, galleries and 
observatories, and any other general academic services (in 
£000s). 
PGOUTPUT The number of higher degrees plus total other postgraduate 
qualifications awarded (including doctorate, other higher 
degrees, PGCEs and other postgraduate qualifications)b 
UGOUTPUT The number of first-degree and other undergraduate 
qualifications awardedb 
RESEARCHa Income received from research grants and contracts (in £000s). 
Source: HESA 
a. These variables are deflated to 2016 values. 
b. A full description of students included in these categories can be found in the HESA data 
documentation. 
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b) VC Pay equation variables 
Variable Definition and source 
LVCSALBEN Natural logarithm of VC salary plus bonuses (2016 values) 
Source: Times Higher Education VC Pay Survey, various volumes 
VRS DEA managerial efficiency 
Source: See text for details 
OVERALL  Overall performance score from The Complete University Guide, 
divided by 100 
Source: The Complete University Guide, various years 
FSI Financial security index divided by 100 
Source: HESA 
LSIZE  Sum of FTE undergraduate students and FTE postgraduate students 
Source: HESA 
LSIZESQ The square of LSIZE 
Source: HESA plus own calculation 
PRE1992 1 if the university is a pre-1992 university, 0 otherwise 
MERGER 1 if the university merged in that year, 0 otherwise 
Source: HESA 
TOPSALCAT Percentage of staff with salary in the top salary band 
Source: HESA 
ACSTAFFSHARE Total academic staff costs as a percentage of total expenditure  
Source: HESA 
VCAGE Age of VC 
Source: University Profiles, Who's Who, Wikipedia, Linkedin 
VCMALE 1 if VC is male, 0 if female 
Source: University Profiles, Who's Who, Wikipedia, Linkedin 
VCNEW 1 if a new VC takes over in a particular year for a given university 
Source: Times Higher Education VC Pay Survey, various volumes 
VCNOPREVEXP 1 if VC has not been PVC or VC (or equivalent) prior to current role 
Source: University Profiles, Wikipedia, Linkedin 
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VCINDEXP 1 if VC has industrial experience prior to current role 
Source: University Profiles, Wikipedia, Linkedin 
LONDON 1 if the university is located in London, 0 otherwise 
SCOT 1 if the university is located in Scotland, 0 otherwise 
WALES 1 if the university is located in Wales, 0 otherwise 
Y2011 1 if the observation is in 2011/12 
Y2012 1 if the observation is in 2012/13 
Y2013 1 if the observation is in 2013/14 
Y2014 1 if the observation is in 2014/15 
Y2015 1 if the observation is in 2015/16 
Y2016 1 if the observation is in 2016/17 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the VC Pay equation variables 
 
a) Continuous variables 
Variable N Mean St Dev Min Max 
VCSALBEN 1,076 249,770 70,904 104,260 719,000 
VRS 968 0.843 0.128 0.451 1.000 
FSI 1,216 3.298 1.200 0.300 6.270 
OVERALL 907 6.109 1.524 2.740 10.000 
SIZE 1,069 12.002 9.189 0.160 79.064 
TOPSALCAT 1,064 14.664 11.825 0.000 100.000 
ACSTAFFSHARE 1,065 30.075 5.921 1.284 43.867 
VCAGE 945 58.987 5.310 45.000 74.000 
 
 
b) Categorical variables 
Variable N 0 1 
MERGER 1,079 1073 6 
PRE1992 1,229 870 359 
VCMALE 1,079 212 867 
VCNEW 1,079 948 131 
VCNOPREVEXP 1,036 799 237 
VCINDEXP 1,037 706 331 
LONDON 1,229 945 284 
SCOTLAND 1,229 1,086 143 
WALES 1,229 1,168 61 
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Table 3: Within and between variation for explanatory variables 
 
Variable 
 
Mean St 
Dev 
Min Max Observations 
VCSALBEN overall 249,770 70,904 104,260 719,000 N =    1076  
between 
 
68,709 122,482 563,214 n =     256 
 
within 
 
29,692 126,590 634,141 bar = 4.203 
VRS overall 0.843 0.128 0.451 1.000 N =     968  
between 
 
0.117 0.506 1.000 n =     240  
within 
 
0.066 0.582 1.175 bar = 4.033 
FSI overall 3.298 1.200 0.300 6.270 N =    1216  
between 
 
1.088 1.380 6.247 n =     270  
within 
 
0.516 1.388 5.766 bar =  4.504 
OVERALL overall 6.109 1.524 2.740 10.000 N =     907  
between 
 
1.554 2.855 9.962 n =     219  
within 
 
0.441 4.423 7.457 bar = 4.142 
SIZE overall 12.002 9.189 0.160 79.064 N =    1069  
between 
 
8.944 0.178 75.789 n =     257  
within 
 
1.449 -3.555 30.396 bar = 4.160 
TOPSALCAT overall 14.664 11.825 0.000 100.000 N =    1064  
between 
 
10.876 0.000 95.980 n =     257  
within 
 
3.210 -39.914 41.867 bar = 4.140 
ACSTAFFSHARE overall 30.075 5.921 1.284 43.867 N =    1065  
between 
 
5.675 2.255 42.532 n =     256  
within 
 
2.075 18.731 52.617 bar = 4.160 
VCAGE overall 58.987 5.310 45.000 74.000 N =     945  
between 
 
5.175 46.000 73.000 n =     211  
within 
 
1.641 55.654 62.154 bar = 4.479 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
 
VCSALBEN VRS FSI OVERALL PRE1992 MERGER SIZE TOPSALCAT ACSTAFFSHARE VCAGE VCMALE VCNEW VCNOPREVEXP VCINDEXP LONDON SCOTLAND WALES 
VCSALBEN 1.000 
                
VRS 0.202 1.000 
               
FSI 0.073 0.171 1.000 
              
OVERALL 0.526 0.016 -0.013 1.000 
             
PRE1992 0.442 -0.049 -0.130 0.674 1.000 
            
MERGER 0.104 0.094 -0.015 0.112 0.089 1.000 
           
SIZE 0.432 0.391 0.222 0.279 0.300 0.146 1.000 
          
TOPSALCAT 0.516 0.038 -0.129 0.726 0.663 0.052 0.323 1.000 
         
ACSTAFFSHARE 0.110 0.050 0.119 0.042 -0.001 0.131 0.196 0.220 1.000 
        
VCAGE 0.230 0.214 0.012 0.164 0.177 0.063 0.074 0.164 0.098 1.000 
       
VCMALE 0.044 0.200 0.037 0.001 0.012 0.034 0.169 0.088 0.106 -0.020 1.000 
      
VCNEW 0.066 0.061 0.033 0.009 0.019 -0.025 -0.027 0.021 -0.022 -0.160 -0.032 1.000 
     
VCNOPREVEXP 0.066 -0.151 -0.097 0.111 0.127 -0.040 -0.099 0.150 -0.105 0.026 -0.143 -0.053 1.000 
    
VCINDEXP -0.026 -0.087 0.003 -0.041 0.006 -0.012 -0.010 -0.064 0.018 -0.048 -0.157 -0.040 0.168 1.000 
   
LONDON 0.039 0.223 0.026 -0.057 -0.048 0.159 -0.045 0.084 0.120 0.162 0.096 0.017 0.082 -0.076 1.000 
  
SCOTLAND -0.126 -0.210 -0.064 0.015 -0.245 -0.027 -0.142 0.079 0.164 -0.071 -0.072 -0.068 -0.030 0.023 -0.172 1.000 
 
WALES -0.045 0.021 -0.078 -0.071 0.122 -0.016 -0.074 0.007 0.011 0.064 -0.022 0.053 -0.084 0.029 -0.100 -0.084 1.000 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Results 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
ALL PRE-1992 POST-1992 
VCSALBEN Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
VRST-1 0.013 0.057 0.017 0.100 -0.034 0.066 
FSIT-1 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.013 0.009 0.009 
OVERALLT-1 0.022** 0.009 0.057*** 0.014 0.018 0.012 
PRE1992 0.082** 0.040     
MERGER 0.036 0.022 -0.016 0.029   
LSIZET-1 0.375** 0.166 -0.116 0.638 0.407** 0.200 
LSIZESQT-1 -0.049 0.034 0.041 0.116 -0.053 0.043 
TOPSALCATT-1 0.003** 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.002 0.002 
ACSTAFFSHARET-1 -0.001 0.002 -0.009** 0.004 0.001 0.003 
VCAGE 0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 
VCMALE -0.034 0.030 -0.021 0.052 -0.025 0.038 
VCNEW 0.073 0.075 -0.087 0.114 0.290*** 0.070 
VCNOPREVEXP 0.007 0.020 -0.035 0.032 0.034 0.023 
VCINDEXP -0.024 0.019 0.026 0.019 -0.035 0.027 
LONDON 0.026 0.029 0.088 0.064 0.020 0.038 
SCOT -0.017 0.032 -0.044 0.049 -0.011 0.038 
WALES -0.072*** 0.027 0.009 0.050 -0.133 0.072 
2011 -0.013 0.009 -0.015 0.012 -0.023** 0.011 
2012 0.007 0.015 -0.003 0.024 0.004 0.017 
2013 0.028* 0.015 -0.005 0.023 0.035* 0.021 
2014 0.046*** 0.018 -0.012 0.027 0.060*** 0.022 
2015 0.081*** 0.021 0.027 0.029 0.095*** 0.028 
2016 0.108*** 0.021 0.028 0.029 0.127*** 0.026 
CONSTANT 11.390*** 0.267 12.080*** 0.840 11.319*** 0.330 
# OF VCS 149  58  92  
# OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
603  239  360  
R-SQ (WITHIN) 0.470  0.433  0.442  
R-SQ (BETWEEN) 0.452  0.459  0.332  
R-SQ (OVERALL) 0.465  0.383  0.384  
WALD CHI-SQ 655.37***  804.42***  1011.77***  
 Note: ***= significant at 1%; **=significant at 5%; *=significant at 10% 
 
 
 Table 6: Robustness checks I 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1  2  3  4  
VCSAL (EQUATION 1) 
VCSALBEN (EQUATIONS 2-4) 
Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
VRST-1 0.040 0.074 -0.008 0.072 0.007 0.045 -0.003 0.062 
FSIT-1 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.026 0.019 0.007 0.010 
OVERALLT-1 0.026** 0.009 0.022** 0.010 0.127** 0.053 0.030** 0.012 
PRE1992 0.059* 0.035 0.081** 0.040 0.084** 0.039   
MERGER 0.035 0.021 0.035 0.022 0.037 0.023 0.039 0.024 
LSIZET-1 0.407*** 0.141 0.374** 0.166 0.371** 0.168 0.503 0.506 
LSIZESQT-1 -0.057* 0.030 -0.049 0.034 -0.048 0.034 -0.085 0.095 
TOPSALCATT-1 0.003* 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.003** 0.002 0.005** 0.002 
ACSTAFFSHARET-1 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
VCAGE 0.004* 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.067** 0.033 
VCMALE -0.034 0.027 -0.034 0.030 -0.034 0.030   
VCNEW 0.045 0.076 0.073 0.075 0.073 0.074 0.106 0.078 
VCNOPREVEXP -0.011 0.021 0.007 0.020 0.007 0.020 0.004 0.026 
VCINDEXP 0.006 0.020 -0.025 0.018 -0.025 0.018 -0.031 0.024 
LONDON 0.025 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.030   
SCOT -0.034 0.033 -0.018 0.033 -0.017 0.032   
WALES -0.074*** 0.021 -0.071*** 0.027 -0.073*** 0.027   
2011 -0.017** 0.009 -0.014 0.009 -0.013 0.009 -0.078** 0.032 
2012 0.008** 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.015 -0.122** 0.058 
2013 0.028** 0.016 0.029** 0.014 0.028* 0.016 -0.166* 0.096 
2014 0.037** 0.019 0.048*** 0.017 0.047*** 0.018 -0.211* 0.125 
2015 0.050** 0.022 0.082*** 0.021 0.082*** 0.021 -0.240 0.157 
2016 0.064** 0.023 0.109*** 0.022 0.108*** 0.021 -0.276 0.188 
28 
 
CONSTANT 11.291 0.237 11.404*** 0.271 11.303*** 0.282 7.735*** 1.906 
# OF VCS 149  149  149  149  
# OF OBSERVATIONS 603  603  603  603  
R-SQ (WITHIN) 0.323  0.470  0.474  0.458  
R-SQ (BETWEEN) 0.492  0.451  0.442  0.071  
R-SQ (OVERALL) 0.460  0.465  0.459  0.119  
WALD CHI-SQ 1003.77***  668.96***  626.66***    
 Notes:  
***= significant at 1%; **=significant at 5%; *=significant at 10% 
1. Equation 1: as Table 5 but with VCSAL as dependent variable 
2. Equation 2: as Table 5 but where VRS is calculated using the VRS DEA model 
Inputs:  PGINPUT, UGINPUT, TOTALEXP 
Outputs: RESEARCH, PGOUTPUT, UGOUTPUT 
3. Equation 3: as Table 5 but where logarithms of VRS, FSI and OVERALL are used. 
4. Equation 4: as Table 5 but with FE estimation. 
 
Table 7: Robustness checks II – Arellano Bond estimation 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1  
VCSALBEN Estimated  
Coef 
Robust 
SE. 
VCSALBENT-1 0.023 0.118 
VRST-1 -0.028 0.048 
FSIT-1 0.017** 0.007 
OVERALLT-1 0.006 0.015 
PRE1992 0.452*** 0.091 
MERGER -0.046 0.057 
LSIZET-1 0.486 0.774 
LSIZESQT-1 -0.131 0.146 
TOPSALCATT-1 -0.002 0.002 
ACSTAFFSHARET-1 0.002 0.003 
VCAGE -0.028 0.028 
VCNEW -0.115 0.082 
VCNOPREVEXP 0.009 0.022 
VCINDEXP -0.009 0.016 
LONDON 0.226** 0.096 
SCOT 0.003 0.058 
WALES 0.138 0.087 
2012 -0.317** 0.142 
2013 -0.245** 0.118 
2014 -0.199** 0.087 
2015 -0.143** 0.061 
2016 -0.068** 0.032 
CONSTANT 13.351*** 2.062 
# OF VCS 117  
# OF OBSERVATIONS 377  
ARELLANO-BOND AR(1) 
AUTOCORRELATION TEST, P-VALUE 
0.045  
ARELLANO-BOND AR(2) 
AUTOCORRELATION TEST, P-VALUE 
0.173  
Notes:  
***= significant at 1%; **=significant at 5%; *=significant at 10% 
Table 8: Robustness checks III  
a) Estimation in levels 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
  
VCSALBEN  Estimated  
Coef 
Robust  
SE 
VRS 0.088 0.056 
FSI 0.003 0.008 
OVERALL 0.039*** 0.009 
PRE1992 -0.030 0.029 
MERGER 0.014 0.040 
LSIZE 0.159 0.173 
LSIZESQ -0.006 0.037 
TOPSALCAT 0.005 0.002 
ACSTAFFSHARE 0.000 0.003 
VCAGE 0.006*** 0.003 
VCMALE -0.015 0.034 
VCNEW 0.050** 0.023 
VCNOPREVEXP -0.011 0.017 
VCINDEXP 0.004 0.015 
LONDON 0.032 0.030 
SCOT -0.035 0.036 
WALES 0.015 0.093 
2011 -0.028** 0.012 
2012 0.004 0.017 
2013 -0.002 0.019 
2014 0.031 0.019 
2015 0.067*** 0.023 
2016   
CONSTANT 11.338*** 0.247 
# OF VCS 152  
# OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
584  
R-SQ (WITHIN) 0.430  
R-SQ (BETWEEN) 0.470  
R-SQ (OVERALL) 0.475  
WALD CHI-SQ 683.67***  
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b) Estimation with lag 2 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
  
VCSALBEN  Estimated  
Coef 
Robust  
SE 
VRST-2 -0.033 0.063 
FSIT-2 0.001 0.008 
OVERALLT-2 0.000 0.000 
PRE1992 0.049 0.025 
MERGER 0.103** 0.049 
LSIZET-2 0.149** 0.165 
LSIZESQT-2 -0.004 0.034 
TOPSALCATT-2 0.004* 0.002 
ACSTAFFSHARET-
1 
-0.002 0.002 
VCAGE 0.005* 0.003 
VCMALE -0.038 0.040 
VCNEW 0.137* 0.079 
VCNOPREVEXP 0.023 0.024 
VCINDEXP -0.021 0.018 
LONDON 0.020 0.036 
SCOT -0.044 0.035 
WALES -0.099*** 0.030 
2011   
2012 0.024** 0.011 
2013 0.035*** 0.013 
2014 0.067*** 0.016 
2015 0.111*** 0.023 
2016 0.140*** 0.021 
CONSTANT 11.723*** 0.255 
# OF VCS 129  
# OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
460  
R-SQ (WITHIN) 0.500  
R-SQ (BETWEEN) 0.374  
R-SQ (OVERALL) 0.413  
WALD CHI-SQ 4850.14***  
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